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Abstract:

Study of the general theory of law, as an independent branch of legal
research, originated in Germany in the mid to late 19th century, and
thereafter became a widely propagated and well-developed subject in
countries such as the UK and the US. Scholars from the Soviet Union
combined the general theory of law with Marxist philosophy and adapted
it from an analytical legal theory to a social legal theory. The inheritance
and development of the general theory of law in China went through three
stages. Specifically, from the 1950s to the early 1960s, the jurisprudence
community fully adopted the legal theories promoted by the Soviet Union;
from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, the studies reflected upon past
theories and sought advancement; and from the late 1990s to present,
research has adopted a more open and innovative approach. In addition,
the philosophy of law and other interdisciplinary subjects have gradually
become dominant research paradigms. A review and compilation based
on the evolution of theories of legal relations showed that the study of the
general theory of law in China is closely associated to the historical rate
of progress of the practice of rule of law and jurisprudence in China. The
overall framework of the research is deeply influenced by the model of
“theories of the Soviet + civil-law prototypes”. In addition, the research
methods have evolved from investigations utilizing a single approach
to processes combining various approaches. The general theory of law
is far from a “relic of history,” and corresponding in-depth research is
recommended for future jurisprudence study in China.
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O

ver the past 70 years, research into jurisprudence in China has taken an eventful
development path, as if traversing through the “Three Gorges Dam” of history, from full
adoption of the theories of the Soviet Union, to difficulties and setbacks in application and even
a destructive effect due to the political environment, to restoring development and re-learning
theories from other countries, and finally to seeking theories and discourse regarding socialism with
Chinese characteristics. Looking back on this process, an interesting phenomenon is uncovered, as
an important part of jurisprudence, studies on the general theory of law, which was once an active
area of study, appeared to be declining over time, at least within the jurisprudence community. The
general theory of law, which is also known as “general jurisprudence” and “legal theory”, refers to
research into jurisprudence based on the fundamental legal concepts and general foundations (such
as functions, principles, structures, and methods) (Liu, 2015, p. 9). From the 1950s to the late 1970s,
research into the general theory of law represented almost the entire field of jurisprudence. The
most representative manifestation was that, following the nationwide transformation of colleges and
universities in 1952, fundamental theory-based courses and textbooks (both domestically compiled
and edited or translated textbooks) from law schools in China were named “Theory of State and Law
(or Legal Rights).” Since the 1980s and 1990s, research on the general theory of law underwent a new
development course; however, challenges and impacts also gradually emerged.
This study aimed to explore and examine the origin of the general theory of law and its
development in China over the past 70 years. In addition to the historical significance of corresponding
research fields, which have been inseparable when reviewing the history of the development of
jurisprudence in China, it can be concluded that the general theory of law remains important, and is a
subject that requires renewed emphasis in order to construct a timeline of jurisprudence in the context
of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Nevertheless, given that the general theory of law covers a
wide range of fundamental legal concepts, a general review lacks in-depth analysis. For that reason,
this study selected one of the most fundamental legal concepts, legal relations, as an example and
used changes in corresponding theories to indirectly reflect the succession and development of the
studies of the general theory of law in China. The choice of legal relations as an example was due to
its fundamental position in the legal system.① In addition, compared to other concepts, legal relations
can be said to be more representative of the history of the legal system in China as it was developed
extensively both in the Soviet Union and in China, which was deeply influenced by the legal schools
of the Soviet Union.
The structure of this study is as follows. First, the study introduces the origin of the research of the
general theory of law in Germany and how it spread to the UK, the US, and the Soviet Union (Section
1). Next, the three stages of development of corresponding studies in China are reviewed. Specifically,
in the first stage (from the 1950s to the early 1960s), the theories of the Soviet Union were fully
① As Albert Kocourek said, the relationship between the concepts of jural relations and jurisprudence is comparable to the relationship between the theory
of gravitation to physics; while a jurist that does not perceive the existence of jural relations is similar to a barbarian that does not perceive the existence of
gravity (See Albert Kocourek, Jural Relations, at iii, The Bobbs Merrill, 1927).
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adopted by Chinese academia (Section 2); in the second stage (from the early 1980s to the late 1990s),
Chinese academia demonstrated progress and achieved breakthroughs (Section 3); and in the third
stage (from the late 1990s to the present), more open and innovative approaches have been adopted
(Section 4). The patterns and characteristics of the development of the research are then summarized
(Section 5), and conclusions are presented in the last section.

The Origin and Popularization of the Study of the General Theory of Law
The Origin of General Jurisprudence in Germany
General jurisprudence① originated in Germany in the mid to late 19th century as an independent
branch of legal research. Although a large number of scholars involved in this research field tended
to have varied viewpoints, they shared the common goal to develop a field of study that merged
Rechtsdogmatik (legal dogmatics) and the traditional Rechtsphilosophie (philosophy of law). The
emergence of the study of the general theory of law was inseparable from the rise of scientific ideas
and the trend of studying law from a scientific approach. Studying law from a scientific approach
required the elimination of metaphysics and the substantive values once applied to legal concepts. As
a result, between the 18th and 19th centuries, the belief in Vernunftrecht (law of reason), equivalent to
Rechtsphilosophie at the time, was challenged. Instead of using supra-positive and a priori principles
to support positive law, scholars began to develop a scientific explanation of general jurisprudence
oriented to fit positive law (Brockmöller, 1997, pp. 26-27). Furthermore, the scientific approach
required systematicness and generality. Although Rechtsdogmatik, which emerged prior to the
codification movement of continental Europe, was called “narrow legal science,” Rechtsdogmatik
alone was not sufficient to ensure the scientification of legal studies. As a method of interpretation,
construction, and systematization of existing positive laws, Rechtsdogmatik was strongly inhibited
by the positive laws of specific fields; hence, its only use was, at most, to explain and refine the
fundamental concepts of the given branches of law and to construct their systemic relationships.
However, the fundamental characteristic of science lies in the transcendence of systematicness and
generality in a given field. Therefore, a general theory of the entire legal system, or even beyond a
specific legal system, based on Rechtsdogmatik, was needed.
At the beginning of the 19th century, Niels Nikolaus Falck explored “general jurisprudence”
from a disciplinary perspective, though he did not explicitly separate the concept from other legal
disciplines. According to Falck, the goal of general jurisprudence was to recognize the universal
and immutable elements that constituted the “pure scientific” part of law and inherent in positive
laws and the nature of legal relations presupposed by legislation. He suggested that it was necessary
① In order to distinguish between different forms of research, in this paper, the terms “general jurisprudence” and “legal theory” are used to refer to the forms of
study regarding the general theory of law in Germany, the UK, and the US; while the term “general theory of law” is used to refer to the specific form of study
on the general theory of law that propagated in China through the Soviet Union.
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to be rid of the influence of positive laws in order to ensure a free and rational environment for the
development of law (Falck, 1819, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, historical jurists in the mid-19th century
found the basis for the “scientification” of law in Roman law. They attempted to grasp a general
proposition for the nature of law by studying how Roman law formed and developed. Roman law was
used to determine the origin of the general structure, concepts, and principles needed for all laws.
Legal science (general jurisprudence) was thus developed through the study of the essence of Roman
law, whereby corresponding objects, systems, and methods were extracted and used as a framework
for legal science. Studies of “legal relations” soon formed an important position within the conceptual
system of law. Friedrich Karl Von Savigny was among the first that systematically elaborated on the
concept of legal relations (Rechtsbeziehungen). In Volume 2 of System des heutigen rö mischen Rechts
I, he discussed topics such as the nature and taxonomy of legal relations, man as the bearer of legal
relations, emergence and elimination, and violation of legal relations. He put forward the classic
definition which states that a legal relation is “a relationship between person and person, determined
by a legal rule (als eine Beziehung zwischen Person und Person, durch eine Rechtsregel bestimmt).” He
also claimed that all legal relations should be considered from substantive criteria (stoff [substance]
or Beziehung [relation/connection]) and a formal principle (the legal definition of the substance),
emphasizing that the rule of law had a deeper foundation (Savigny, 2010. pp. 9-10). Thereafter, Rudolf
von Jhering developed an “anatomical” perspective of law (“anatomische” Betrachtungsweise des
Rechts), analyzing its concepts and structures, which in turn greatly influenced the analytical school
of jurisprudence (Brockmöller, p. 274).
Adolf Merkel, a student of Jhering, was the first to argue for a “general theory of law” (allgemeine
Rechtslehre) as an independent field of study. In his paper “Über das Verhältnis der Rechtsphilosophie
zur ‘positiven’ Rechtswissenschaft und zum allgemeinen Teil derselben” published in 1874, Merkel
first conceptualized legal science as general jurisprudence and specific branches of legal science. The
theoretical basis of general jurisprudence was to guide legal dogmatics toward general problems and
concepts. General jurisprudence involved the study of higher-level concepts with legal significance
beyond the limitations of specific branches of law, associated instead, to legal science as a whole
(Merkel, 1874, p. 3 ff.). Furthermore, he classified general jurisprudence as consisting of laws
(including their structure, classification, and formation), legal relations, applications of law, and legal
science (Merkel, 1913, pp. 5-8). In his Elemente der allgemeinen Rechtslehre (1899), he conducted a
more systematic study of the fundamental concepts of law, the state, commands, power, legal norms,
justice, legal relations, and subjective law (rights), with an emphasis on the exploration of the concept
of legal relations. Inheriting the definition of legal relations proposed by Savigny and applying it to
the relation of right in rem, Merkel further defined legal relations as the relationship between the
rightsholder and all other legal persons surrounding the given object, as the ownership granted by
the law restricts the nonowners, rather the object itself (Merkel, 1899, p. 637). Moreover, he discussed
the content of legal relations (the correspondence between rights and obligations) and suggested that
rights represented positive acts within legal relations, while obligations represented negative acts; and
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The Propagation of the General Jurisprudence in the UK and the US
By the beginning of the 20th century, general jurisprudence had attracted the attention of jurists
and civil law scholars across a number of countries such as France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, who
either adopted the German theories (especially those of Savigny), or developed theories through a
contrarian approach, yielding abundant corresponding research. Influenced by the trend of scientific
and empirical research, academia in the UK and the US also generated many representative works,
such as J. W. Salmond’s Jurisprudence or the Theory of the Law (1902), J. C. Gray’s The Nature and
Sources of the Law (1909), W.N. Hohfeld’s Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (1913, 1917), and Albert Kocourek’s Jural Relations (2nd Ed., 1927).
The origin of general jurisprudence in the UK and the US can be traced to Jeremy Bentham and
John Austin, while Bentham’s Of Laws in General (1872) can be regarded as the forerunner of research
in this field.① Of Laws in General analyzed a range of fundamental legal concepts. Particularly, in
the chapter “Aspects of a Law,” he created a typology of four possible aspects, including command,
non-command, prohibition, and permission which were later regarded as moral modalities of legal
relations (Bentham, 2008, p. 126 ff.). John Austin’s The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832)
was the first work of its kind in the history of legal theory that distinguished systematically and in
detail the different uses of the term “law” and restricted the research subject of jurisprudence to
existing laws that were “set by men to men” (Austin, 2002, p. 13 ff.). Although in terms of the time,
the aforementioned works were published earlier than those of Merkel, they only focused on a limited
number of fundamental legal concepts and lacked a comprehensive and systematic structure (which
also constituted the characteristics of research in general jurisprudence in the UK and the US). In
addition, general jurisprudence was not considered as an independent discipline. Hence, they can be
regarded as the “germ that seeded” general jurisprudence.
Salmond distinguished civil law studies as consisting of theoretical and practical jurisprudence,
emphasizing that theoretical jurisprudence (general jurisprudence) was “the science of the first
principles of the civil law”. His seminal work focused on the analysis of legal sources, legal rights,
personality, and freedom (Salmond, 1913, p. 3, 7, 117 ff.). Gray’s book, however, analyzed fundamental
legal concepts and their interconnections, with an emphasis on legal rights and obligations (contents
of legal relations), while defining the various subjects of legal relations (Gray, 2012, p. 3, 8, 24 ff.).
However, in terms of theory in legal relations, Hohfeld was considerably more influential. In
two extensive papers published in the 1910s, Hohfeld established two jural groups of legal relations
(“opposites” and “correlatives”) surrounding eight concepts (“right,” “duty,” “privilege,” “no-right,”
“power,” “liability,” “immunity,” and “disability”); this allowed the variety of potential legal relations
to be analyzed accurately and comprehensively (Hohfeld, 2009, p. 28 ff.). On this basis, Kocourek

① It was believed that the book was completed in 1782, yet not published at that time. In 1945, Bentham’s manuscript was carefully compiled, and his work was
published for the first time under the name “The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined”. In 1970, Herbert Hart re-edited and republished it under the name “Of Laws in
General”.
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provided a comprehensive elaboration of legal relations. His work, which consisted of 20 chapters,
covered legal relations from the perspective of terms, definitions, elements, classifications, and
objects.① In addition, Kelsen published the English version of General Theory of Law and State (1945)
following his migration to the US, in which his main viewpoints were highlighted. The book had
extensive influence in the English-speaking academic community and related corresponding studies
between continental European and the UK and the US. He defined the theme of a general theory of
law as “the legal norms, their elements, their interrelations, the legal order as a whole, its structure, the
relationships between different orders, and, finally the unity of the law in the plurality of positive legal
orders” (Kelsen, 2017, pp. 19-20), while reducing concepts such as legal duty, legal responsibility, legal
rights, competence, and legal persons to legal norms.
After the 1950s, British and American scholars of the Analytical School were extensively
involved in the study of fundamental legal concepts, such as Hart’s study of laws, as well as related
concepts of orders, rules, and duties (Hart, 2018), and interpretation of responsibility (Hart, 1989).
Joseph Raz’s conceptual analysis of the legal system was considered extensively (Raz, 2003), as was
Mac Cormick’s typification analysis of legal competence and relations, legal relations, and objects
(Cormick, 2019, pp. 171-228). In his five-volume work, Jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound, a representative
of sociology of law, dedicated an entire chapter to “analysis of general juristic conceptions” such as
rights, powers, freedom, duties and liabilities, persons, acts, and objects (Pound, 2007, pp. 31-413).
These studies and works had a worldwide impact on legal studies.
In summary, research in general jurisprudence in continental Europe and the UK and the US had
the following disciplinary attributes: (1) it was a normative discipline about positive law; (2) it involved
an overview of law and legal science (Rechtsdogmatik); (3) the research subjects mainly involved
fundamental legal concepts; (4) it was based on the form of structure research on positive law (contrary
to traditional philosophy of law that emphasized ethical intent); and (5) it aimed to generalize and
systematize legal knowledge (toward a scientific approach) (Lei, 2018, pp. 85-86). Thus, the analytical
tradition of the general theory of law was born.
Studies of the General Theory of Law in the Soviet Union
Prior to the October Revolution in Russia, there were also numerous works on topics related to the
general theory of law, such as S. А. Muromtsev’s Opredelenie i osnovnoe razdelenie prava (Definition
and Primary Division of Law) (1879), N. M. Korkunov’s Obŝaja teorija prava (General Theory of Law)
(1904), Е. Н. Trubeckoj’s Ènciklopedija prava (Encyclopedia of Law) (1906), and G. F. Shershenevich’s
Общаят
е
орияправа (General Theory of Law) (4-volume edition, 1910-1912). In particular,
Korkunov’s theory was deeply influenced by traditional German theories. His work was translated
① See Albert Kocourek, Jural Relations, at iii, The Bobbs-Merrill, 1927, pp. 1-423. It is worth mentioning that the theories of Hohfeld and Kocourek also
affected corresponding studies in contemporary China, although not extensively (see Shutang Yan’s “Comment on Hohfeld’s ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions’;
Kocourek’s ‘Jural Relations’, Wuhan University Social Sciences Quarterly, 1930, Issue 1). Half a century thereafter, when domestic scholars once again paid
attention to Hohfeld’s viewpoints, his ideas caused a profound impact (see following sections). Kocourek’s theory, however, had no domestic influence at all.
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into English and had a great impact in the US in the 1920s, facilitating exchanges between the two
academic communities (Korkunov, 1922). These works provided a starting point for the study of
the general theory of law in the Soviet Union to a varying degree; however, the country underwent
revolutionary change thereafter.
Following the October Revolution, the general theory of law quickly became mainstream in
jurisprudence research and the core theme in law education in the Soviet Union, leading to the
publication of a large number of textbooks and monographs. The reasons for its rise to prominence
are as follows. First, the Soviet Union legal scholars believed that their mission was to specify and
clarify legal concepts by summarizing legal experiences from the socialist state; this involved the
study of common legal problems from all aspects of Soviet law (Piontkovskiĭ, 1956, p. 48). During
this shift, the concept of “legal relations” received unprecedented attention. From the perspective
of the Soviet scholars, legal relations proved that a unique socialist legal science could exist as legal
phenomena contrary to those of capitalism (Халфина, 1971, p. 26). Moreover, Marxist philosophy
became an unquestionable orthodox theory in philosophy (of law), while Soviet jurists’ responsibilities
emphasized applying Marxist philosophy to each legal concept. The only freedom jurists had was to
argue the proposition for the correct interpretation and application of Marxist principles. The most
prominent manifestation of Marxism in research of the general theory of law lay in the following
two aspects: First, the term “general theory of law” was replaced by “the (general) theory of state
and law.” Correspondingly, due to the state and law being regarded as a whole in Marxist theory, the
theory of the state was expounded upon significantly more in the academic works of the period. The
state is the product of class struggle, while law is the embodiment of the will of the ruling class; hence
the state and law simultaneously emerge and disappear. For that reason, the theory of the state and law
had common goals and corresponded when merged. Since there was no neutral methodology for the
research of the state and law, political and legal tasks should be resolved simultaneously (Mapčenko,
2010, p. 6). Second, the fundamental content of the “general theory of the state and law” can be
defined as the general law of the emergence and development of the state and law and corresponding
functions. Particularly, the history of the theory of the state/law became the focus of research. The
connection between the state and law, which had been generally ignored in the studies of the general
jurisprudence in continental Europe, the UK, and the US, was founded upon historical materialism.
Research into the general theory of law in the Soviet Union could thus be divided into three stages:
from 1918 to 1937 (first stage), from 1938 to the beginning of the 1950s (second stage), and from the
mid-1950s to the present (third stage).①
For the first stage, significance was shifted toward legal relations as Marx’s statement of law
being rooted in society. As Marx stated, “Society is not founded upon th law…On the contrary,
the law must be founded upon society, it must express the common interests and needs of society.”
① This differentiation method was adopted from Shu Guoying, Jural relations. [ed.] Yongfei Wang and Guicheng Zhang, Review and Evaluation of Jurisprudence
Research in China, China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1992, p. 493-494. The period of the third stage in the Soviet Union was the first stage
of research into a general theory of law in China; hence, the third stage is discussed in the next section.
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“Neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the
basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but on the contrary they originate in
the material conditions of life.” Therefore, each form of production creates its own classification of
legal relations. Representative works such as Pēteris Stučka’s Revoljucionnaja rol’ prava i gosudarstva:
Obŝee učenie o prave (The Revolutionary Role of Law and State: the General Theory of Law (1921) and
Evgeny Pashukanis’s The General Theory of Law and Marxism (1924) were created based on these
viewpoints. Stučka defined the law as “a system (or order) of social relationships which corresponds
to the interests of the dominant class and is safeguarded by the organized force of that class.” Since
the social relationship in the quote mainly referred to economic relations, the law was considered
equivalent to the sum of the specific social and economic relations. In his view, property and legal
relationships were merely another name for economic relationships (Kelsen, 2004, p. 10). Pashukanis
considered legal relations as “social relations in a commodity-producing society”. He believed that
the main body of legal relations involved an owner handling commodities through acquisition
and assignment, with the legal object serving as the commodity in question. A legal relationship
thus involved legal obligations and rights; however, obligations were alternative manifestations of
corresponding rights. Thus, legal relations were not only directly derived from the existing social
relationships of production, but also formed the core of the legal structure. As such, it was considered
that only legal relations permitted the law to achieve its true momentum; and without the existence
of commodity economics, social relations, and legal relations, all legal norms became meaningless
(Pashukanis, 2008, p. 40, 47, 50, 52). Therefore, it could be said that Soviet scholars at this stage
subverted the common understanding of priorities between the two conditions of legal relations,
namely, legal norms and social relations. In some instances, legal norms were considered to be an
optional factor. Moreover, it was believed that social relations (economic relations), legal relations, and
the law were the same to a certain extent.
The second stage began with the first All-Union Conference on the Science of Soviet Law and
the State (Vsesojuznom soveŝanii po voprosam nauki gosudarstva i prava) in July 1938, whereby
Soviet Prosecutor General Andrey Vyshinsky issued a long report entitled “The Fundamental Tasks
of the Science of Soviet Socialist Law”. In the report and a later work, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo
(Soviet State and Law), Vyshinsky attacked the anti-normative theories proposed by scholars such
as Pashukanis and Stučka. Vyshinsky believed that, although laws, legal relations, and production
relations were closely related, they could not be equated. For Vyshinsky, Social relations had a
basis in reality and had material roots, and were the fundamental nature of law, while law was the
embodiment of social relations. However, neither social nor legal relations were law itself, as law was
neither a system of social relations nor a form of production relations, but rather a rule of conduct or
regulations approved by the state power and guaranteed and enforced by the state (Vyshinsky, 1955, p.
100). Nonetheless, as a flag bearer of Marxism, Vyshinsky also recognized that social relations were
at the foundation of law (and legal relations) while refusing any relation that his viewpoints bore with
normative theories (such as that of Kelsen) (Vyshinsky, pp. 508-511). In general, during this second
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stage, law was redefined as consisting of “norms” (although it was regarded as a tool for the ruling
class, the two concepts were not contradictory); thus, law was re-separated from social and legal
relations. The legal theories of Vyshinsky remained at a dominant position in the history of Soviet law
for nearly 20 years.
The most distinctive feature in the study of the general theory of law in the Soviet Union is the
substitution the traditional analytical legal theory with social legal theory. This shift in the research
perspective on the general theory of law also reflected the differences between Marxism and other
theories. Marxism involved the approach of research from a sociological perspective, with a focus
on the conditions for the emergence and effect of law, while other theories often adopted a normative
viewpoint, whereby the structure of the normative system is analyzed (Kelsen, p. 238). These two
types of approach constituted two major schools of the research of the general theory of law. In
addition, due to Marxism, the Soviet theories of legal relations created a “strained relationship”
between legal norms and social relations due to difficulties in determining which played the leading
role in legal relations. This tension actually reflected the two characteristics of legal relations: legality
and sociality. The methodological transformation in the study of the general theory of law and the
inherent tension within the theory of legal relations also deeply influenced corresponding research in
China, due to the heavy influence of the Soviet Union.

Full Adoption of the Research of General Theory of Law in the Soviet Union
(1950s to early 1960s)
Following the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the state created higher law education based
on the Soviet model. Given that reconstruction of a nation required a new ideology that was compatible
with the nature of the regime, the jurisprudence of China was immediately imprinted with political
ideology, which manifested in all aspects of study, such as the disciplinary setting, educational goals, and
research purposes. In short, jurisprudence served politics and was used as a tool to achieve political tasks
(Wang & Gao, 2012, p. 19). Given that China and the Soviet Union shared a highly similar ideology, the
general theory of law in the Soviet Union fit the needs of the state. The faculty of law, Renmin University
of China, established in 1949, assumed the important task of training teachers and experts from legal
departments of universities nationwide. The teaching and research office of the theories of the State and
Legal Rights of the university became the center for disseminating the Soviet model for the general theory
of the state and law (Liu, 2011, p. 111-112). Lectures, textbooks, and monographs from Soviet experts
were translated, compiled, and rewritten into textbooks uniformly used by universities. Vyshinsky’s
Voprosy teorii gosudarstva i prava (Issues of Theory of State and Law) (1955) and M. P. Kareva et al. Teorija
gosudarstva i prava (The Theory of State and Law) (1957) were the most renowned of the period. The
Textbook on Marxist-Leninist Theory of the State and Legal Rights (1st Ed. in 1952, reprinted in 1954), edited
by Institute of Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Institut Prava AN SSSR) and N. G. Aleksandrov’s
Zakonnostʹ i pravootnošenija v sovetskom obŝestve (Law and legal relations in the Soviet society) (1958) were
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also widely studied. Politics and Law Translation Series, a journal founded by the Chinese Political and
Law Studies Association in 1956 became an important platform for publishing translations related to the
Soviet model. In view of the historical background and environment at that time, although some domestic
units also compiled lecture notes and readings on the general theory of the state and law, the style,
structure, and basis of viewpoints were still derived from Soviet jurisprudence.① Moreover, legal relations
theories were fully adopted from the third stage of legal relations development in the Soviet Union.
Throughout the mid-to-late 1950s, the theory of legal relations was focused on the research of
the general theory of law in the Soviet Union and China. Compared to the previous stages, legal
theories at this stage were developed surrounding the tone and framework defined by Vyshinsky
(adapted accordingly) (Liu, p. 83, 89); however, new developments were observed. In February
1956, the Institute of Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences organized a legal relations seminar,
at which Kareva and S.F. Kechekjan presented their reports. These presentations defined the tone
for the study of legal relations in the Soviet Union and China, thereafter. Strictly speaking, scholars
had not yet reached a unified definition of legal relations; nevertheless, the existing definitions were
not in contention with one another, but rather explained the concept from varied angles (subject,
content, or a combination of the two). The most authoritative definition at the time was given by the
Юридическийсловарь’ (Law Dictionary). According to the dictionary, legal relations are but one
form of social relations characterized by a relation in which the participants are bonded by the rights
and duties specified under legal norms. Legal relations, in essence, were determined by the foundation
of society and were ideological (Kudryavtsev, 1957, p. 116). The general theory of law in this period
presented a more thorough understanding of the fundamental principles of Marxism, especially the
effect and converse effect between the economic base and superstructure, as well as a more adept
usage of Marxist methodology. As pointed out by the Honored Scientist of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic), A. A. Piontkovskiĭ, the unified scientific methodology of Soviet theory
was the concept of materialist dialectics (Piontkovskiĭ, p. 40). Materialist dialectics included historical
materialism and dialectical materialism, which manifested in both the characteristics and content of
legal relations.
The scholars of this period achieved broad application of historical materialism. In terms of
the relationships between legal relations and legal norms and social relations, scholars rejected the
unrepresentative perspective adopted by the jurisprudence of continental European (which emphasized
legal norms) and the previous two stages of the Soviet Union (which emphasized social relations), but
rather regarded legal relations as the combined product of social relations and legal norms. Based on
such an approach, they were able to define two attributes of legal relations. The first was sociality. The
root of legal relations was social relations within the sphere of material life; hence, legal relations were
restricted and determined by social relations in material life. Moreover, legal relations both emerged
① Such as The Essential Issues of the Theory of State and Law published by the Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China in March 1957 and Lectures
on Theory of State and Legal Rights (I, II) compiled jointly by members of the teaching and research office of the theories of the State and Legal Rights, Law
School, Renmin University of China, China Renmin University Press, 1957.
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from and depended on economic relations (Keililova, 1957, p. 46). However, legal relations differed
from social relations (with an economic base); social relations were regulated by legal relations, which
were within the superstructure and should not be confused with economic relationships (Gromova,
1956, p. 91). The second attribute was legality. According to scholars at the time, legal relations were
unique social relations formed based on legal norms. Legal norms were thus necessary conditions or
prerequisites for legal relations, without which, they could not exist (Kareva et al., 1957, p. 438). Social
relations were thus the foundation for legal relations and content; while legal relations were second in
priority, serving as an insulator for social relations. Legal relations were considered the mediator of
legal norms and social relations; specifically, the regulating function of legal norms and the converse
effect of law on the economic base were achieved through specific legal relations.①
Soviet scholars also utilized the “material/consciousness” framework to position legal relations. It
was believed that legal relations were relations of will. Legal relations were regulated by legal norms,
which were the manifestation of the will of the ruling class; hence, legal relations inevitably reflected
the will of the ruling class (Gromova, p. 90). However, scholars had inconsistent viewpoints in terms
of whether legal relations were solely relations of the will of the social classes. Some scholars insisted
that legal relations could also, however not always, reflect the individual will of the participants
(Aleksandrov, pp. 208-209). While others were still of the divisive viewpoint that legal relations
reflected predominantly individual will (Starikovich, 1957, p. 2). This was contrasted by those that
advocated for a compromise, where although legal relations were not defined by a dependence on
individual will, they reflected individual will in application (Romashkin, Strogovich & Tumanov,
1963, p. 464). Moreover, since all relations of will stemmed from ideology, legal relations began to
be considered an extension in form of ideological (social) relations. This viewpoint stemmed from
Lenin’s dichotomy of “material” and “ideological” relations. According to Lenin, “Social relations are
divided into material and ideological relations. The latter merely constitutes a superstructure on the
former, which takes shape independent of the will and consciousness of man as (the result) the form of
man’s activity to maintain his existence” (Lenin, 1955, p. 131).
The application of dialectical materialism became intertwined in the contents of legal relations.
However, the rate of progress of legal relations as a research field was limited when compared to the
achievements of the previous periods. Scholars defined rights as state-protected prospects for the
obligee to conduct certain behaviors (including the prospect of requiring others to perform certain
behaviors), while duties were defined as the behavior conducted by the obligor required by legal
norms (Kareva et al., pp. 452, 454). Contrary to rights in Western theories, where legal rights are seen
as “pre-stated” (“innate”) values, rights in the Soviet Union were bonded by state (“law”), which was
a distinctive feature of Marxism. In terms of the relationship between rights and duties, the majority
of scholars emphasized the mutual connection, interdependence, and mutual restraint between the

① See [USSR] S. F. Kechekjan, Legal Norms and Jural relations, [trans.] Jiaen Li, [eds.] teaching and research office of “Theory of State and Legal Rights,” Renmin
University of China, Selected Translations of Theoretical Papers of the State and Law (1st Edition), China Renmin University Press, 1956, p. 196.
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rights and duties of the subjects in legal relations. Such viewpoints were specifically manifested as
two principles. The first principle was that rights and duties corresponded; the rights of one subject
always corresponded to the duties of the other. The second principle was the unity of rights and duties;
a subject could not exercise his/her rights without bearing a duty; as such, upholding duties were seen
as a prerequisite for exercising rights (Kareva et al., pp. 454-455).
Compared to legal relations, scholars had more conflicting viewpoints on topics where historical
materialism and dialectical materialism could not be directly applied. One representative example was
the object of legal relations, of which scholars were unable to reach a consistent understanding. Some
believed that the object of legal relations referred to the object towards which the rights and duties of the
subject were directed (Kareva et al., p. 449). Some scholars argued that the object of legal relations and
that of rights and duties were different concepts, whereby the object of a legal relation is the affected social
relation, while the objects of a right and duty are specific phenomena, things, and behaviors (Starikovich,
p. 10). Other scholars argued that the object of all legal relations are human behaviors (Aleksandrov, 1958,
pp. 98-99, 101). In addition, viewpoints differentiated among scholars in terms of the classification of
legal relations’ objects. Two methods were commonly accepted. The first was dichotomy, which divided
the object of legal relations into things and actions (Gromova, p. 92), or things and the outcome of labor
(intangible benefits) (Keililova, p. 48). The second was trichotomy, which divided the object of legal
relations into things and material wealth, intangible wealth, and behaviors.
From the 1950s to the early 1960s, Chinese scholars fully adopted Soviet Union theories related
to the study of the general theory of law. The fundamental principles of Marxism in this period were
more maturely applied to the study of law, especially historical materialism and dialectics. For that
reason, research on the general theory of law in China emerged with the following characteristics.
Fields to which Marxism could be directly applied showed little disagreement between scholars. Even
if disagreements existed, they were less likely to be opposing viewpoints. However, in fields where
Marxist principles and theories lacked direct application (fields where more specific legal knowledge
was required), conflicts between scholars erupted. Thus, a fundamental consensus was reached on the
nature of legal relations, and the relationship between rights and duties, yet divergent opinions were
held on the definition and classification of the objects of legal relations. As a consequence, studies
where Marxist principles could not be applied usually lacked clear standards, boundaries, in-depth
arguments and sufficient supporting evidence. This defect became the historical basis for the research
of the general theory of law among the jurisprudence community and largely restricted research in the
early stages of development.

Reflection and Breakthrough of the Research of the General Theory of Law
(1950s to early 1960s)
Following the end of the Cultural Revolution, China restored legal education and research into
jurisprudence began to recover. Prior to 1980, the jurisprudence textbooks of the political and law
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colleges and law schools in comprehensive universities continued to refer to the textbooks of the Soviet
Union, and the textbooks retained the name (General) Theory of the State and Law.① At that time,
no distinctive differences existed between the studies of the theory of the state and jurisprudence.
Jurisprudence, which did not have its own independent research area, essentially remained a part of
political science (Xu, 2018, p. 46). However, from the 1980s, the jurisprudence community began
to intentionally separate jurisprudence from political science and established jurisprudence as an
independent discipline. The publication of works such as References of Fundamental Theory of Law
(1980) edited by Yongfei Wang, Fundamental Theory of Law (trial edition of the textbook for Peking
University) (edited by Shouyi Chen and Hongsheng Zhang, 1981), and Fundamental Theory of Law
(trial edition of the jurisprudence textbook used by institutions of higher education) (1982) symbolized
how “fundamental theory of law”, as a discipline, gained recognition from within jurisprudence
academia. At least, from the chapter title, “the state” no longer held a prominent position. In the
late 1980s, what was most likely the final official textbook named The General Theory of Law was
published. In addition to the sections that could be found in previous versions, such as “the nature of
law” and “the history of law,” the book also reorganized “the fundamental categories of law” (such
as rights and duties, legal norms, legal systems, legal relations, legal responsibilities, legal awareness),
and included topics such as “legal operations and processes” and “the relationship between law and
other social phenomena.” The book was thus seen as a prototype for the later jurisprudence textbook
system. In addition, there were still several Soviet and Russian works being translated into Chinese
during this period; however, the majority of the textbooks were named “The General Theory of Law”
and the works had much less influence compared to the translated works in the previous stages of
development.②
Nevertheless, changes in the names of the books did not indicate complete separation from past
viewpoints. In fact, the overall framework of the general theory of law in China during this stage
maintained its Soviet style, and could only be considered “an improved version” of the theory of the
state and law in content, while political ideology remained an important part of theory. However,
informal textbooks and academic works showed that Chinese scholars were more active in exploring
the subject from new angles. The research topics greatly expanded; studies on legal relations began to
cover content such as the competence of the subjects, classification, and the systematization of legal
relations. More importantly, in addition to adhering to Marxist theories and methodology, scholars
began to consciously reflect on the theories proposed by Soviet scholars and sought breakthroughs.
First, scholars attempted to deepen or revise existing research. Although the definition and
characteristics of legal relations generally remained unchanged, scholars conducted in-depth reflections

① Such as Thematic Topics and Bibliographies of Theory of State and Law (1978) compiled by the Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Theory of
State and Law (1979), a textbook written and edited jointly by the teaching and research office of “State and Law,” Law School, Renmin University of China.
② See [USSR] L.S. Jawitsch, General Theory of Law, [trans.] Jingwen Zhu, Liaoning People’s Publishing House Co., Ltd., 1986; [Russian] [ed.] V. Lazarev,
General Theory of State and Law, [trans.] Zhe Wang, et al., Law Press China, 1999. Even though the book edited by Lazarev still put “law” and “state”
together in the title, it proposed independence of law from the state, and law was prioritized in the text.
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on the implications of the characteristics. In terms of the social nature of legal relations, it was
recognized that social relations had dominant significance for legal relations. However, legal relations
and the relations regulated by legal norms were divergent social phenomena; legal relations were the
means of legal action while relations regulated by legal norms were the target of regulation (Alekseyev,
1988, p. 463). Regulation by legal norms did not necessarily transform social relations into legal
relations, and legal relations were not a substitute for social relations (Zhang, 1985, pp. 54-55). Legal
relations were then considered the unification of social content and legal forms (Zhang, p. 211). In
addition, although scholars all agreed on the legal nature of legal relations, some scholars believed that
“legitimacy” was a more appropriate description, as the parties of a legal relation must comply with the
law (or be sanctioned by law); as such, legal relations manifested as legal social relations (Shu, p. 517).
Chinese scholars continued the debate started among Soviet scholars of whether legal relations
reflected only the will of the state or the individual will of the participants; however, no unified
viewpoint emerged. Compared to the Soviet theories, Chinese scholars differentiated in detail the will
of the ruling class, the expression of will of the participants when a specific legal relationship was
formed, and the expression of will of the participants when exercising rights and duties. A distinctive
highlight of the period was between “will” and “relations of will.” It was believed that, although the
formation of legal relations might have required the involvement of the will of the participants, it
did not necessarily indicate that legal relations were relations of will. Since all relations formed in a
society involved the will of the people, legal relations were not distinctive in this regard (Li, 1989).
This realization led to a debate among Chinese scholars: Do legal relations extend from an economic
base or the superstructure? In addition to the conventional viewpoint that legal relations are ideological
and therefore a part of the superstructure, a more representative claim was that legal relations were
a combination of ideological and material relations (or the unity of will and social content) (Shao &
Song, 1988, p. 19). In some instances, the dichotomy between the economic base and superstructure
was breached to propose that legal relations not only included ideological and material relations, but
also included relations of productivity (Zhang, 1988, p. 8).
In an attempt to surpass and innovate theories of the Soviet Union, legal relations were regarded
as a “dynamic process”. As such, legal regulation was partitioned into three stages. The first was the
creation of law, where social relations were stipulated from a legal perspective and abstract behavioral
patterns (rights and duties) were determined. The second stage was the implementation of stage law,
where abstract behavioral patterns were embodied as specific rights and duties between subjects as
legal facts emerged, forming a legal relation. The third stage was the execution of law, where subjects
of legal relations exercised their rights and duties to meet the expectations of legal norms. Legal
relations was thus considered the result of the implementation of law. Such an interpretation reformed
Soviet scholars’ static interpretation of the relationship between legal norms and legal relations.
With regards to the content of legal relations, the debate was divided between “right-centricity”
and “duty-centricity”, leading to a profound influence on the Chinese legal community in the late
1980s. The symbolic event of the debate was the “National Seminar on Fundamental Categories of
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Law” hosted by Jilin University in 1988. The seminar proposed a reconstruction of the legal theory
system with legal rights and duties as fundamental categories, and transformed the view of rights as
essential to the reconstruction of the legal system, which contributed to the birth of the “right-centricity”
school.① However, many opposed such an approach (Zhang, 1990), while others attempted a more
moderate tactic (by claiming that rights and duties were equally important) (Feng, 1990; Guo, 1991).
The dominant position of the “right-centricity” theory in the debates stimulated research on “rights”
thereafter. These changes suggested that, beginning with fundamentals of rights and duties, Chinese
academia had begun to abolish the traditional research paradigm of the general theory of law.
In relation to such breakthroughs, the greatest innovation at this stage was exploration of the
object of legal relations. In addition to the question of whether the object of legal relations is the object
of legal rights, a crucial debate topic of Soviet academia, scholars also raised two new questions.
The first was whether the object of legal relations was actually an element of legal relations. It was
generally considered that the object, subject, and content of legal relations are all elements of legal
relations. However, the belief that the object was not an element of legal relations gradually emerged.
Specifically, since the object was a function of rights and duties, it need not be conceptualized as
a legal relations construct (Zou, 1992, p. 42). The second question was whether the object of legal
relations was actually the same as the subject matter (target). For the most part, the two concepts were
not differentiated; however, the question presented the idea that the object of legal relations was a
(legal) behavior in all instances, while the subject matter (target) was the specific object to which the
behavior was oriented (Xue, 1995, pp. 21-22).
Studies on the taxonomy of objects in legal relations achieved significant progress during this
period; scholars expanded on the classification of objects far beyond that of the Soviet theories and
proposed a four-class theory, namely, the “thing”, “person”, “products of spiritual activity”, and
“results of conduct”.② In addition, a new understanding and interpretation of each classification
was proposed, with the exception of “things”, which remained as is. The term “products of spiritual
activity” were derived from the term “intangible wealth” or “intangible property” in the concepts of
jurisprudence of the Soviet Union, where wealth and property represented interest. However, strictly
speaking, the legal good (Rechtsgut) recognized and protected by law was not an object in itself; it was
the externalization of Rechtsgut that was the object (Shu, p. 541). For that reason, it was proposed that
the expression “intellectual products” was more scientific, which was further suggested as consisting
of intellectual and moral products (Zhang, 1991, p. 72). The term “results of conduct” was a revision
of the term “behavior” proposed by Soviet jurisprudence. Although some scholars insisted that legal
behaviors were an object of legal relations, a growing school of thought argued that behaviors were
the “social content” of legal relations (Zhu & Han, 1994, p. 35) (while rights and duties were the legal
forms of such content). The object of rights (legal relations) was thus the result of the completion of the

① One representative work was that of Wenxian Zhang, Analysis of the Semantics and Definitions of Right-Centricity, China Legal Science, 1990 (4), p. 33.
② Of course, the premise here is not to distinguish between the object and subject (target) of jural relations.
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obligor’s conduct that satisfied the requirements of the obligee (results of conduct). Moreover, results
of conduct could be separated into tangible and intangible results (Shu, p. 544). Compared to the
remaining three categories of legal objects, “personal rights” was a concept completely conceived by
Chinese scholars. Although in the mid-1980s, some official textbooks claimed that “personal rights”
could not be an object of legal relations under any circumstances in socialist laws due to the confusion
between “person” (as the subject of the legal relations) and “personal rights” (as the object of legal
relations); however, it was increasingly supported that “personal rights” could be an object in certain
situations (Zhang, 1986, pp. 92-93).①
The final pivotal development was the application of the corresponding theories in fields other
than civil law. Given that the general theory of law was defined as “general,” it should be positioned
above and applicable to all other branches of law; however, modern jurisprudence developed based on
the fundamental legal concepts of civil law. As a result, the “generality” of a general theory influenced
by civil law became questionable. Further examination was required to determine whether the general
theory could shed the presupposition of civil law and exert persuasive and explanatory power in all
branches of jurisprudence. Although Starikovich pointed out as early as the 1950s that few academic
works on criminal, trial, and administrative law included issues related to legal relations (Starikovich,
p. 12), his fellow scholars showed little intention to fill this research gap. Thus, in apparent response to
Starikovich’s criticism, some 30 years later, Chinese scholars began the task of expanding coverage of
legal relations from civil to other areas of law. The most representative endeavor was the application of
legal relations to the study of criminal law; resulting in theories of criminal legal relations (Shu, 1985;
Liu, 1993). However, such efforts were not recognized by all scholars. Furthermore, it was questioned
whether rights and duties constituted the content of all legal relations (Zhang, 2000, pp. 8-10).
To summarize this section, from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, research on the general theory
of law in China penetrated the ice of the Soviet predecessors. Chinese scholars demonstrated the will
to shed the influence of Soviet tradition and politics and construct a more scientific and independent
legal discipline. The academic community initiated active discussions and debates and proposed
a variety of new ideas and viewpoints. Although still influenced by Soviet jurisprudence, Chinese
scholars attempted in-depth exploration and revision of the Soviet theories while adhering to the
fundamentals of Marxism. New topics and concepts were proposed, and gaps in research were filled.
In addition, the application of the general theory of law was expanded beyond civil law to determine
the extent of “generality” of the theory. However, due to the lack of fundamental academic consensus
and methodological consciousness, there was still a lack of professionalism when conducting
meticulous and judicious analyses. For that reason, the study of the general theory of law required
moving beyond the initial stage of “spontaneous creation” to a stage of “conscious innovation”
through the application of external knowledge resources and professional methodological instruments.
① See Guangbo Zhang, Legal Theories, Jilin University Press, 1986, p. 92-93. Nevertheless, many scholars failed to distinguish between “personal rights” and
“personality” by using them interchangeably or regarded both as objects of jural relations. However, “personality” was an innate element of the person as the
subject of jural relations; therefore, it could not become the object of jural relations.
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An Open and Innovative Approach to Research on the General Theory of Law
(late 1990s to the present)
From the late 1990s, the development of jurisprudence in China entered a “fast track,” where
historic breakthroughs were achieved as jurisprudence obtained a legitimate position as an
independent discipline in the fields of legal science, philosophy, and social science. “Jurisprudence”
replaced “fundamental theory of law” and became the official name of the discipline. Although
the textbooks named “Jurisprudence,” edited by each politics and law college, had their own
characteristics, the contents showed a similar trend: an increasing number of topics were included,
such as the origin and development of law, the value of law, legal operations, law and society, and
the rule of law (including the rule of law in China).① Such themes extended far beyond the coverage
of the conventional “general theory of law.” Some textbooks also incorporated the debates of legal
concepts (Shu, 2012, pp. 25-28), or were edited completely based on the framework of the philosophy
of law (Xu, 2009). Moreover, the individual research of jurists increasingly diversified, as the
conventions of jurisprudence study were put aside and specific knowledge was sought in accordance
with their own interests, which included pedigrees of knowledge and theories extending from authors
(such as Hans Kelsen, Gustav Radbruch, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Posner, Herbert Hart, Ronald
Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Niklas Luhmann, and Robert Alexy), schools of thought (such as natural law
and legal positivism), ideological trends (such as law and literature, feminist jurisprudence, critical
jurisprudence, Marxist jurisprudence), and academic themes (such as legal system modernization and
legal transplantation) (Shu, 2019, p. 15). As a result, disputes arose over various subjects (such as the
most appropriate pathway for legal system modernization), schools of thought (such as social science
of law and Rechtsdogmatik [legal dogmatics]), and methodologies (such as normative approaches or
the Big Society approach). In this period of revitalization, the study of philosophy of law regained an
important position in jurisprudence, while various interdisciplinary studies (such as sociology of law,
legal anthropology, law and economics, and law and cognitive science) began to emerge and flourish.
These changes were associated with the political and social environment of the period. Important
theoretical questions were put forward during legal practice, and jurists began actively promoting
legal reforms and the rule of law in China, while utilizing a variety of theoretical resources,
approaches, and methods. Distinctively, issues related to the rule of law (the system of the rule of
law and the rule of law in China) were prioritized in the jurisprudence community. The fundamental
strategies for governing the state emerged based on the political concepts of “ensuring law-based
governance, building a country of socialist rule of law,” and“ensuring every dimension of governance
is law-based,” “advancing the modernization of China’s system and capacity for governance.”
Correspondingly, the branches of disciplines related to such concepts, such as philosophy of law and
sociology of law, rose in popularity among academia. Such a shift in research did not directly signify
① Representative textbooks include Wenxian Zhang, Jurisprudence (5th Ed.), Higher Education Press, Peking University Press, 2018.
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that the study of the general theory of law was completely replaced by other research, but rather
indicated that the study of the general theory of law during this stage deepened to become more
diverse and intellectual. Moreover, the traditional fundamental legal concepts required modernization
to be more in line with the times. Although a decline was observed in the number of academic
achievements during this stage, and scholars tended to focus on specific aspects of fundamental
legal concepts (for example, the discussions on legal relations focused on the contents such as legal
rights) rather than the systematic study of some or all of the concepts, important innovations were
achieved while Chinese scholars continued the research pathways of the previous stage. Discussions
mainly concentrated on two aspects: constructing the elements of legal relations and deepening the
understanding of the objects of legal relations. More important changes were reflected in two aspects.
The first change was the active incorporation of theoretical achievements from foreign theories of
law into Chinese discussions while seeking novel approaches. Research on the general theory of law
began integrating theories other than Marxism; a large number of works from Continental Europe
(mainly Germany), the UK and the US were translated into Chinese, which greatly enriched reference
resources.① The new generation of jurist scholars began consciously constructing unique theories
based on foreign jurisprudence, while integrating discussions from the international arena. Contrary
to previous stages of development, additional attention was cast on the history of a given theory, as
well as the inheritance and development of academic traditions. Novel findings were thus consciously
sought, and arguments emerged with solid academic foundations.
Due to the efforts of scholars in civil law, Savigny’s theory was translated and published in
Chinese, and his theory of nature and classification of legal relations spread widely (Savigny, 2004,
pp. 1-12; Savigny, 2010, pp. 257-332). Comprehensive reviews of Savigny’s theory of legal relations
were conducted, which included the background of the theory, the relationships between legal
relations, life relations; the legal systems and nature, elements, and characteristics of legal relations;
and the connection between legal relations and private law (Zhu, 2010).
In addition, significant effort was invested in the study of the content of legal relations, mainly,
legal rights. In Chinese academia, “rights” and “duties” were consistently recognized as fundamentals
aspects (or even the most fundamental aspect) of jurisprudence. Jurisprudence was considered to be
“the study of rights and duties” (especially “the study of rights”), while legal relations were considered
to be “the relationship between rights and duties of the subjects”. In particular, influenced by the
once dominant “right-centricity” theory, legal rights became the focus of discussion and research.
In addition to the study from the perspective of the philosophy of law (which focused on the dispute
between “the theory of interest” and “the theory of will”), research on the general theory of law was
concentrated on the classification of legal rights and the relationship between rights and duties. The
advancements achieved corresponded with the introduction of the work of American analytical jurist,

① After the 1990s, Japan also had a great influence on the jurisprudence community in China. Nevertheless, this influence mainly focused on legal sociology
and legal interpretation theories, rather than the general theory of law; hence, it is not included in this study.
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Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Achievements were also made by Chinese scholars in the study of rights
prior to (in addition to) the introduction of Hohfeld’s theory. For example, Soviet theories lacked a
clear partition between “rights” and “power/authority”, which were addressed in the early 1980s by the
work of Zongling Shen (Chen & Zhang, 1981, pp. 354-355). Zhiwei Tong further suggested that legal
relations manifested three groups of relations: “rights-power,” “rights-rights,” and “power-power” (Tong,
1999, pp. 28-30). Guoying Shu was the first domestic scholar that further divided rights into rights of
freedom, claim rights, and appeal rights (Shu, 1995, pp. 4-6). These viewpoints were similar to those
of Hohfeld to a certain extent; however, the framework proposed by Hohfeld was more comprehensive
and systematic regarding the four opposite and correlative jural relations, where a detailed analysis
of each was performed (Hohfeld, p. 26 ff.). Zongling Shen brought significance to Hohfield’s work in
China when he compared Hohfield’s model with corresponding concepts in existing branches of law
and regulations (Shen, 1990). Based on this analysis, Shen noticed a fundamental difference between
Chinese and Western theories, where Chinese theories considered rights to have a private nature, while
power was considered public. This implied that conceptual differences existed between the concepts of
the “rights” and “power” of the subject, Rechtsgut, and the relationship between duty and the coercive
force of the state. However, such conceptual differences did not exist in the Western context (Shen,
1998, p. 8).
The previous generation of scholars built their theories on the opposing relationship between “public
power” and “private rights,” while studies of the new generation were more in line with Hohfeld’s original
claim, which considered “power” as a sub-category of “rights” in a broad sense; hence, “power” exists in
both a private and public legal context. However, it was the civil law scholars, rather than jurisprudence
academia, that initially interpreted legal relations using Hohfeld’s original theory. Generally, either Hohfeld’s
four classifications of rights (claim, privilege, power, and immunity) were compared to conventional
taxonomy in German civil law theory (Anspruch [right to claim], Herrschaftsrecht [right of dominion],
Gestaltungsrecht [right to influence a legal relationship by unilateral declaration/right of formation], and
Gegenanspruch [counterclaim]) (Wang, 1998, pp. 591-593), or his theory was used to construct models
based on specific elements of legal relations (Ran, 1999). Compared to specific branches of law, scholars
of jurisprudence extensively explored the depth of meaning of Hohfeld’s model. In addition to mere
breakdown, modification to Hohfeld’s theory (such as the modification of the eight fundamental concepts
and their relationships) were suggested (Liu, 2018, p. 119 ff.). Interestingly, in this instance, “applied”
research preceded “prototypical” research, reflecting a fundamental pattern of research in the general
theory of law in contemporary China, whereby dissatisfaction with existing theories and growing demand
for new theoretical resources originated from a specific branch of law, stimulating jurisprudence scholars
to conduct corresponding in-depth studies.
The second significant shift in thought was the application of conceptual and logical analyses in
studies. In addition to substantive viewpoints, methods used in early theories (analytical legal theory)
were introduced from other countries, specifically conceptual and logical analyses. The revival of
conceptual and logic analyses was mainly due to the translation, propagation, and demonstration
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of works from Britain and American analytical jurisprudence. In addition, the rise of analytical
philosophy and logic in philosophy in academia during this stage, and their influence on legal scholars,
stimulated the incorporation of conceptual and logical analyses in the research of the general theory
of law. The majority of studies covering Hohfeld’s model adopted conceptual analysis methods. In
addition, conceptual analysis was used to challenge the relevance (or unity) of rights and duties (Chen,
2014). Logical analysis was also incorporated into the research of legal rights, to logically analyze the
structure and taxonomy of legal rights (Lei, 2014) and to introduce deontic logic to conduct systematic
analysis of the eight fundamental concepts and their complex structures of interrelations (Xiong, 2019).
Different from the conventional studies that employed materialistic dialectics or values from philosophy
of law, new approaches were explored to expand investigations of legal relations.
From the late 1990s to the present, research on the general theory of law in China has experienced
stable development. Although the proportion of relevant research, compared to the total number of
jurisprudence studies, has decreased noticeably, the quality of the research has significantly improved.
Specifically, scholars have expanded academic horizons, introduced and incorporated mature theories
from foreign academic circles, and modified concepts to match the Chinese context. In addition,
research has shifted from simple analyses and specific application of theory to theoretical progress
and independent innovation. More importantly, the predicament of research dominated by the social
legal theory was overcome by applying conceptual and logical analyses, and the development of the
general theory of law faced new opportunities and challenges.

The Patterns and Characteristics of Research on the General Theory of Law in
China
The formation of an independent taxonomy symbolizes the maturity of a discipline (Huang, 2019, p.
10). Over the past 70 years, despite uneven pathways during development of the general theory of law,
a characteristic system of legal concepts and taxonomy was constructed. The development patterns
and characteristics over the past 70 years can be summarized as follows.
The development of the general theory of law in China has been closely associated to the historical
process of the practice of the rule of law and the legal progress. Over the past 70 years, jurisprudence has
undergone three revolutionary stages of exploration and achieved three historical developments (Zhang,
2019, pp. 23-28). After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, when a socialist legal system was
established and a new system for socialist jurisprudence was explored, research into the general theory of
law was based on the general theory of a Marxist state and law. Academia inherited the perspectives of
Marxist positions, viewpoints, and methods to study fundamental legal concepts. However, restricted by
historical conditions, the studies were heavily influenced by the Soviet Union. Vyshinsky’s “class struggle”
paradigm had a dominant position in corresponding research, and there were misunderstandings and
misinterpretations of Marxist legal theory. Due to weak theoretical foundations and a lack of knowledge
and skills within the legal system, Chinese academia was unable to establish a theoretical system that was
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original and fortified. For that reason, following the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and the worsening
of the political environment in the 1960s, research into the general theory of law come to a standstill. The
second stage emerged following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978.
The socialist legal system and the fundamental strategy of law as a method of governance was restored,
improved, and optimized and a socialist law with Chinese characteristics was sought. Following the Cultural
Revolution, an ideological revolution to “set things right and debunk the falsehoods” was initiated, Chinese
jurists began to make notable achievements and impacts on the establishment of a more comprehensive
jurisprudence system. Particularly, revolutionary progress was achieved in the research on the general theory
of law, allowing the discipline to modernize and new topics to be explored with broader academic horizons
and deeper foundations. However, certain problems remained. As was previously discussed, the preceding
focus on the classic works of Marx and Lenin led to the rejection of other theories, which narrowed jurists’
perspectives. An opposing trend materialized after the 1990s, when scholars (especially the new generation
of jurists) concentrated excessively on the general jurisprudence of Western countries, casting insufficient
focus on the inheritance and development of Marxist conventions. Marxism is an open theoretical system
that continues to progress with modern developments, practice, and science. The Marxist approach to law
and its sinicization can only operate as a gradual process of rationally incorporating core elements from other
academic traditions based on the practice of law in China and modern prerequisites to ensure a scientific and
optimized basis. The third stage began following the The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, which promoted the comprehensive use of law to govern the country, building a socialist nation ruled
by law, and exploring the construction of a legal system with Chinese characteristics. The Fourth Plenary
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made “ensuring every dimension
of governance is law-based” as its core theme, a first in the history of the ruling party. The session proposed
a systematic and comprehensive top-level design of the construction of the rule of law characteristic of
Chinese socialism. Correspondingly, the need to accelerate the construction of a legal system with Chinese
characteristics (incorporating disciplinary, academic, and discourse systems) to meet the requirements of lawbased governance became increasingly eminent. Methods to use the new ideas, thoughts, and strategies for
governing the country by law promoted the historical innovation of the sinicization and modernization of the
general theory of Marxist law.
Research into the general theory of law in China was greatly influenced by the model of “theories
of the Soviet Union + prototype of civil law”.① The Soviet theories, especially those of Vyshinsky,
had long dominated Chinese jurisprudence. Although, from the 1990s, Chinese academia began to
increasingly focus on the research results and theoretical views of other countries and other academic
traditions, the mainstream paradigm was still heavily influenced by Soviet theories (which were
reflected in the official state-compiled textbooks). Such influences were not only manifested in the
specific views of legal relations theory (such as the characteristics of legal relations, the definition

① Professor Guoying Shu pointed out more than 20 years ago that, on the whole, the theory of jural relations in our country (China) in the new era still followed
the pattern of “theories of the former Soviet Union + traditional theory of civil jural relations” that prevailed in the 1950s.
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of the relationships between social relations and legal norms, and the emphasis on the will of the
state), but also in the research frameworks of legal relations’ studies (such as the key elements of
legal relations). The power of political and legal traditions and ideologies was influential, and the
progression and development of the research paradigm of the general theory of law was not achieved
overnight. Jurists were faced with the challenge of overcoming rigid dogma and pure ideology while
reasonably adhering to the core concepts of Soviet theories, and shifting research toward the general
theory of true “law” (rather than the superficial partition of “law” and “state”), restoring the position
of the general theory of law as the general theory of the narrow legal science (Rechtsdogmatik), and
constructing a more fundamental scientific and academic system.
The general theory of law originated from civil law. Civil law was seen in history as the “mother
of all laws” and was the first branch of law to mature and provide theoretical sources for fundamental
legal concepts such as legal relations. This was true in Germany, as well as the Soviet Union and China,
which inherited the Soviet theories. However, the origins restricted scholars’ “theoretical imagination”
to the characteristics of civil law, which resulted in the conscious or unconscious use of civil law as a
presupposition when constructing a general theory of legal relations. As a result, the “general theory
of law” became untrue to its nature. Although, compared with the 1950s, since the 1980s, Chinese
scholars have been able to better illustrate some of the theoretical issues of legal relations with examples
of practice in China, and the theories of legal relations have been applied to other branches of law, the
theory of legal relations has remained narrow in its vision and unsophisticated in its methodology. The
conventional theory of legal relations “can only partially explain the civil legal relations, rather than
fully explain the criminal legal relations, administrative legal relations, and constitutional legal relations.
Therefore, the existing jurisprudence theories on legal relations in China tend to have insufficient
persuasive and explanatory power in jurisprudence and legal practice” (Liu, 2008, p. 44). For example,
legal relations in criminal law cannot be simplified into a binary framework of “rights (rights to claim)
and duties,” and the legal objects in criminal law cannot be found among the classifications of “things,”
“personal rights,” “products of spiritual activity,” and “results of conduct.” For that reason, some
branches of law have excluded legal relations from their textbooks, which contradicts “legal relations”
as the “logical middle term” of jurisprudence. Gradually reducing the bias of civil law and developing a
more general theory that extends to all branches of law will be an important criterion for assessing the
professional competence of future Chinese jurists.
Finally, with respect to research methodology, a variety of methods are being incorporated, as
opposed to the use of single-methodology studies in the general theory of law. For Chinese jurisprudence,
the Marxist methodology is a fundamental scientific method that has been tested over time and practice
and should be skillfully and carefully applied to the study of fundamental legal concepts rather than
abandoned. As claimed by scholars D. A. Kerimov and B. V. Sheindlin, from the Soviet Union, the study
of the general theory of law relies on a unified Marxist methodology and historical materialism. From
the perspective of historical materialism and political economics, it is a specialized science; it is also a
comprehensive science for various branches of legal science (legal dogmatics). However, when studying
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specific concepts of fundamental law (such as the taxonomy of legal relations’ objects, classification and
structures of rights and duties, and legal facts), a combination of other methods, especially analytical
methods (conceptual and logical analyses), is necessary, due to Marxist methodology being a social theory.
Although this has advantages in grasping the nature and development pattern of phenomena through
qualitative analysis, it lacks more refined quantitative research on the structure and elements of law from
a professional legal perspective, as required by the research on the general theory of law. If research
into historical materialism and dialectical materialism are the fundamental “dao (path)” of law and
legal practice, then analytical methods are the “qi (instrument)” of theoretical inquiry that facilitates the
demonstration of the inherent complexity of law and jurisprudence. Only by emphasizing both the “path”
and the “instrument” can the fundamentals of the discipline be mastered with professionalism, while
shedding immaturity in perspectives. A promising trend has recently revealed that analytical methods
have gained increasing attention among the new generation of jurists and the combined use of methods
has emerged in academic works; however, such applications have not yet entered the mainstream. It has
been pointed out that, “among all changes, the change in methodology is the greatest progress” (Heck,
1993, p. 32); as such, compared to substantive claims, the “awakening” and modernization of methodology
has even greater significance for the future of research on a general theory of law.

Conclusion
The rise of research into the general theory of law (general jurisprudence) in the mid to late
19th century and its subsequent spread across Europe and America (including the Soviet Union)
was an inevitable manifestation of its precedent. The emergence of research represented that, with
the increasing use of scientific methodologies, jurisprudence had gradually shifted away from the
conventions of metaphysical philosophy and moved closer to application-oriented legal dogmatics,
ensuring a specialized and scientific approach. Contradictorily, the development of Chinese
jurisprudence over the last 70 years has shown an opposing trend. The starting point of Chinese
jurisprudence research was not the philosophy of law, but rather research into the general theory of
law under the heavy influence of the Soviet Union, which dominated and exhausted the ingenuity of
Chinese jurisprudence researchers. Although the philosophy of law (including the interdisciplinary
study of law and other disciplines) did not become mainstream in legal studies in China until
only 20 years ago, it quickly dominated academia, leading to a decline in research on the general
theory of law. As a result, efforts to explore fundamental legal concepts remain insufficient. The
“ontology of law” and “fundamental concepts of law (legal science)” remain the only visible signs of
general jurisprudence in textbooks. Such a dichotomous theoretical attitude devalues the historical
conventions so carefully developed and ignores the requirements of the current era. The socialist rule
of law with Chinese characteristics in the new era of China requires the support of jurisprudence
in the theoretical system, discourse system, and conceptual system more than any other time in the
past. To this end, it is essential to promote research into the general theory of law, providing new
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connotations in the current era, and implementing a systematic re-structuring of the discipline.① The
general theory of law is far from an “historical relic”. On the contrary, while not hindering research
into the philosophy of law and other legal research methods, jurisprudence scholars must meet the
needs of the times in the development of legal disciplines while introducing foreign studies and
adhering to Marxist theory to construct a consistent and original fundamental legal system.
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